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the existence of noise traders into equilibrium asset pricing (Kyle, 1985 , DeLong et al., 1990 , empirical evidence on the relevance of investor sentiment does not provide clear findings (see e.g. the polar results in Cliff, 2005 and Wang, Keswani and Taylor, 2006) .
We tie up these two questions and investigate whether sentiment of institutionals and individuals matters for aggregate stock market movements and whether the influence of sentiment of these two groups is systematically different. Using a new data set that covers both institutional and individual investors we find, first, that sentiment matters for several stock markets around the world and over intermediate horizons of up to one year. Second, there is a sharp difference between the two investor groups. Institutional investor sentiment forecasts stock returns correctly on average. Individual sentiment negatively predicts market movements in a way that is consistent with the hypothesis that overoptimistic (-pessimistic) noise traders drive markets away from intrinsic values. Third, in line with these findings, institutional investors become more pessimistic (optimistic) when they expect individuals to become more optimistic (pessimistic). Therefore, our contribution to the literature is twofold. We first employ a new data set that covers genuine investor sentiment from a weekly survey, twice-separated on individual and institutional investors as well as on short and medium forecasting horizons based upon several major stock markets around the world. This data set allows us to analyze investor sentiment while controlling for factors like the geographical distance of a market relative to the home country, forecast horizon and sophistication of investors. This is new to the literature since previous studies have to rely on proxies for (mostly institutional) sentiment (e.g. Neal and Wheatley, 1998 , Bodurtha, Kim and Lee, 1995 , or Wang, Keswani and Taylor, 2006 or rather examine sentiment of individual investors for the US market exclusively (Kumar and Lee, 2004 or Lee, Jiang and Indro, 2002) .
Second, we contribute to the literature by directly extending a new empirical modelling approach from Brown and Cliff (2005) to the case of two investor groups.
Earlier studies employing sentiment data have focussed on short run predictability in first or second moments (Lee, Jiang and Indro, 2002, Wang, Keswani and Taylor, 2006) . Following Brown and Cliff (2005) we investigate longer term effects of sentiment on stock markets since the building up of excessive optimism or pessimism, i.e. sentiment, is likely to be a persistent process whose effects on stock prices would be hard to detect over short horizons. Whereas Brown and Cliff limit their analysis to individuals, we jointly analyse the impact of both individuals and institutions on stock prices and complement their approach with further analyses that all point to the main result of this paper: individual sentiment is a proxy for noise trader risk and institutions seem to be smart money.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: the next section derives testable hypotheses from earlier studies and section 3 describes the data set. Section 4, 5 and 6 show empirical results and section 7 concludes.
Hypotheses and earlier literature
One of the basic issues related to studies of investor sentiment deals with the question whether sentiment contains unique information for asset pricing. Indeed, there is lots of evidence that investor sentiment, moods or the awareness of investors for certain topics affect conditional moments of equity returns. This includes among others the high-volume premium documented by Gervais and Kaniel (2001) , index additions and deletions (see e.g. Chen, Noronha and Singal, 2004) or rumors and talks in internet chatboards investigated by Antweiler and Frank (2003) .
On a theoretical level, the model of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) gives room for systematic under-and overreaction of stock returns due to shifts in investor sentiment. Using several proxies for investor sentiment Neal and Wheatley (1998) and Baker and Wurgler (2006) find that sentiment proxies heavily affect the cross-section of stock returns, e.g. that they affect the size effect or the relative prospects of different groups of stocks sorted by characteristics like volatility and dividend payments.
These results seem to carry forward to the realm of real economic activity. Polk and Sapienza (2004) even find sentiment to have effects on the real economy by influencing managers' decisions to issue new shares when sentiment is high. Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2006) find survey measures of investor expectations to beat all traditional forecasting methods when predicting inflation in the U.S. which highlights the information contained in investor surveys. Therefore we expect that sentiment, as measured by genuine investor surveys, matters for stock returns for a period of intermediate to long horizons as in Brown and Cliff (2005) .
Since financial economists typically view individuals and institutions differently due to their relative size and sophistication and many researchers find that both groups often take opposite positions when trading (e.g. Kaniel, Saar and Titman, 2005, Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu, 2005) we expect sentiment of individuals to have a different effect than sentiment of institutions.
Regarding the nature of the difference between individuals and institutions, we observe that Brown and Cliff (2005) find strong evidence for the hypothesis of excessive overoptimism which holds that noise traders who get overly optimistic (pessimistic) about a series of good (bad) news tend to push asset prices above (below) intrinsic values (see also Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) . Since many researchers view individuals as the proverbial noise traders (Kaniel, Saar and Titman, 2005) it implies that individual sentiment forecasts returns negatively, i.e. higher individual sentiment implies lower expected returns since asset price eventually come back to their fair values. Therefore our first hypothesis is, that individual investors' sentiment negatively predicts returns at longer horizons. As a by-product of this hypothesis, we also expect sentiment to have a contemporaneously positive effect on returns, i.e.
higher individual sentiment pushes prices up.
Evidence from trading data implies that institutions are informed investors (e.g. Chakravarty, 2001 ) although, as noted in the introduction, there is also evidence on non-sophisticated behavior of institutions like herding. However, for the functioning of financial markets there must be at least some market participants who collect and interpret fundamental information to calculate fair asset prices. Moreover, recent research indicates that the influence of fundamental risk factors on returns is state dependent and therefore needs to be interpreted by investors (see inter alia Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2004 , Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan, 2005 or Conrad, Cornell and Landsman, 2002 . Since this is a demanding task, we would expect institutions due to their size and sophistication to fulfill this function. Therefore, we expect institutional sentiment to be positively correlated with expected stock returns, i.e. institutional sentiment correctly predicts market returns over longer horizons. This makes up our second hypothesis.
Finally, given that there is noise trader risk in financial markets, DeLong et al (1990) show that equilibrium asset prices reflect a corresponding risk premium. We are obviously not able to test this directly, but expect that institutional investors take into account this noise trader risk. Therefore, we test whether institutions who expect higher optimism (pessimism) by individuals get more pessimistic (optimistic) since they heed that noise traders drive price above (below) intrinsic values. Our third hypothesis therefore is, that institutional traders take into account sentiment of individual investors when forming their expectations.
Data and descriptive statistics
We use data based on a weekly survey, called sentix (sentiment index). These are collected by "sentix -behavioral indices" and are available on the internet via www.sentix.de to frequent participants of the survey. They are also obtainable inter alia via Bloomberg, Thomson Financial, Ecowin or Reuters. The survey distinguishes between answers from institutional and individual investors. Although everybody who wishes to join-in the survey is allowed to, once registered online, there is an identity check in the case of institutional investors: Only investors who register with an e-mail adress of an institutional investment firm (e.g. banks, brokers, asset managers) are allowed to vote for the category "institutional investor". Survey participation is not compulsory but frequent participation allows users to both access the time series of sentiment indices as well as special analyses by the operators of the survey -hence this provides an incentive to participate on a regular basis.
Participants are being asked anonymously what they think will be the direction of the market for the short (one month) and medium (six months) run for several major stock markets in Europe, the USA and Japan. They can choose three answers, namely "up", "unchanged" and "down" for both time horizons separately. We centre our investigation upon the medium horizon answers 2 of both private and institutional investors for the DAX30 (DAX), EuroStoxx50 (ESX), Nikkei225 (NK), S&P 500 (SP) and NASDAQ 100 (ND).
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The sentix survey covers the period from February 23, 2001 to February 11, 2005 and consists of 199 observations, as some weeks were not evaluated due to offical 2 As we find short run sentiment to be very noisy which confirms the results in Brown and Cliff (2005) In order to make our data operational we first need a sensible measure to aggregate the survey answers. A common way to do this is to use the so-called bull-bearspread (Brown and Cliff, 2004) which is computed by the number of positive minus negative answers divided by the total number of survey participants. We thus define our bull-bear-spread S i t for each of the five stock indices as
where i denotes institutional (i = I) or individual (or private, (i = P )) investors.
The superscipt m indicates the respective stock maket, i.e. m= DAX, ESX, ND, SP or NK. #P OS t (#N EG t ) being simply the number of positive (negative) voters in week t. Finally, #OBS t denotes the total number of survey participants in week t which is made up by positive, negative and neutral voters.
As a basic ingredient for the following analysis we also use log returns for each respective stock index. Descriptive statistics of these variables used can be found in Finally, one might be concerned that the sentiment indices presented in Figure 1 are not only very persistent as indicated by the Ljung Box tests presented above but may even be unit-root nonstationary. Theoretically, there is a strong prior that the sentiment indices are stationary in the long run, because they are bounded between plus and minus one by construction. However, the series may well be nonstationary in a finite sample like ours. This poses a problem, because as is well known, the question whether a time series has a unit root or is just very persistent is unanswerable in finite samples (see e.g. the discussion in Hamilton, 1994 , p. 444-447 or Cochrane, 1991 . We present several unit-root tests for all ten sentiment indices in Table 2 .
On the 5% level, the null of a unit root is always rejected by the Phillips-Perron (1998) test, is almost always rejected by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test (except for individual NIKKEI 225 sentiment) and is rejected for only 6 of the time series when using the more recent DF-GLS test of Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996) . Therefore, the tests offer no clear advise. Since we are mainly interested in the information contained in the levels of sentiment 4 , we will present analyses that explicitly take into account the high persistence in the sentiment indices and also analyses based upon the assumption that the time series are nonstationary. Finally,
we investigate an implication of the so obtained results on the first differences of sentiment indices. Encouragingly, all three analyses are confirmative to each other.
Long-horizon return regressions
This section performs a simple and intuitive test for the existence of noise trader risk and smart money effects and establishes the main result of the paper. Extending the empirical framework of Brown and Cliff (2005) to the case of two investor groups we run predictive regressions of stock returns on past sentiment of both individuals and institutions. The results show that individuals consistently forecast the wrong direction whereas institutional sentiment forecasts returns correctly.
Econometric methodology
We closely follow Brown and Cliff (2005) in the empirical setup to ensure comparability of our results. However, contrary to them we include both institutional and individual sentiment in our analysis to jointly test for the existence of noise trader risk and smart money. Towards this end we estimate long-horizon return regressions of the form
with the average k−period excess return 5 for market m as endogenous variable and several predictors on the RHS. These predictors include sentiment of individual S P,m and institutional investors S I,m as well as typical macro and micro factors used in the asset pricing literature. These additional risk factors are collected in the matrix Θ and are detailed below. We employ known up-to-week t information to forecast cumulative excess returns beginning in week t + 1 only.
Equation (2) can be used to test hypotheses 1 and 2 discussed in section 2. If sentiment matters for stock returns the coefficients β 1 , β 2 should be nonzero. For the existence of noise trader risk and overoptimism among individuals (hypothesis 1) we expect β (k) 2 < 0 since overoptimism which pushes prices above intrinsic values eventually has to be reversed which implies that higher individual sentiment leads to low expected returns. For institutions to form correct expectations (hypothesis 2)
1 > 0 must hold, i.e. higher institutional sentiment is followed by higher returns.
Since the regression approach measures net effects of each regressor (net of all other regressors) it is possible to determine if institutional sentiment correctly predicts market movements net of fundamental (Θ) risk factors and noise trader risk (S P ).
A common and nowadays well known problem with long-horizon regressions of the form above is, that they cannot simply be run by standard econometric tools even if robust covariance matrices are used. Several authors (see Stambaugh, 1999 , Valkanov, 2003 , or Ferson, Sarkissian and Simin, 2003 have documented this problem, which is mainly caused by highly persistent regressors that evolve as stochastic processes themselves. In this case OLS estimation results are at best consistent but no longer unbiased although all regressors are predetermined. For simple regressions with only one predictor it can be shown analytically that the bias in coefficient point estimates increases, the stronger the persistence of the regressors gets (Stambaugh, 1999 ). As we show in Table 1 our sentiment indices are highly persistent. 6 A further complication arises from the overlapping of the sums of returns, which induces a moving average structure to the error terms ε
Different ways have been proposed to circumvent these problems, mostly relying on some form of simulation procedure (see e.g. the application in Brown and Cliff, 2005) or auxiliary regressions (Amihud and Hurvich, 2004) . In order to establish comparability with the results of Brown and Cliff (2005) we follow them by simulating small sample confidence intervals and test statistics for the coefficient estimates of each return regression separately to overcome this spurious regression problem (Ferson et al, 2003) . The procedure used is described in Appendix A1. There we also describe the ingredients to the matrix of control factors Θ which is slightly different across markets due to data availability for the respective countries.
Estimation results and interpretation
Results of this estimation-simulation procedure are depicted in Figure 2 . The figure shows the estimated effect of a one standard deviation movement in institutional (left column of the figure) and individual (right column) sentiment for each horizon k = 1, . . . , 60 weeks and simulated small sample 95% confidence intervals.
The results are clear-cut and confirm our hypotheses 1 and 2. Institutional investors' sentiment correctly predicts long-horizon index excess returns for most horizons in This causes a subsequent reversal to intrinsic values so that individual sentiment and expected returns are indeed negatively related. Thereby we confirm the findings of Brown and Cliff (2005) for markets outside the U.S.
Since our investors are asked about their expectations regarding a six months horizon we also present estimation results of the two relevant parameters β 1 and β 2 for this horizon, i.e. k = 24 in Table 3 . Reported are bias adjusted coefficients and p-values based upon simulated critical values for the t-test. We also report the percentage bias in coefficient estimates, denoted ψ i,m7 , the simulated upper and lower critical values for the t-test on the 5% significance level, denoted t u and t l , and an analysis of the forecast root mean squared error (RSME) and Theil's U. It can be inferred, that on this special forecasting horizon, some coefficients are significant only on the 10% level. The most impressive results stand for the two US American markets which have the highest R 2 s, the highest covariance proportion of the root mean squared errors (RMSE) and the lowest p-values. The results for the two European and the Japanese markets are worse and not all of them are significant on the 5% level.
7 Remember that i indexes institutional (I) and individual (P ) investors respectively.
However, it is unlikely that investors report exact "24 week" sentiment but rather their general medium term expectations. These might be based upon a somewhat longer or shorter period which would explain the strong results for other periods as presented above. Finally, the simulated critical values for the t-statistics are much larger in absolute value than those employed in standard coefficient tests, which clarifies the need to adjust for the effects of persistent regressors.
The results shown in Figure 2 are also significant in economic terms and higher in absolute magnitude than those in Brown and Cliff (2005) . There they find that a one standard deviation shock in sentiment leads to a cumulative decrease in excess returns of 7% over three years. We cannot examine this long horizons but our analysis shows that net effects of individuals over horizons of one year are approximately -10% whereas institutional sentiment has an effect of roughly +10% across markets.
However, these results should not be interpreted easily as being evidence against the efficient markets hypothesis. First, the implementation of a trading strategy to exploit these relations has to take into account severe transaction costs since the underlying sentiment data arrives weekly. Second, there is large parameter uncertainty for the European market over horizons up to 36 weeks for institutional and up to 40 weeks for individual investors impact on returns. A longer horizon could well be outside the usual investment horizon of many investors. Third, our results reveal that institutional sentiment is likely to represent fundamental risk whereas individual sentiment is a proxy for noise trader risk. Therefore, positive excess returns from a trading strategy based on sentiment should turn out to carry significant risk from both sources. Fourth, out of sample data is needed to perform realistic tests for the profitability of such a trading strategy.
The analysis in this section directly accounted for problems of persistent regressors and their distorting effects on coefficient estimates and test statistics. However, if there really are unit-roots in our sentiment indices the analysis could be extended to directly deal with this problem in a more standard setup. We therefore present analyses based on VEC models in the next section which lead to confirmative results and yield some further insights into the dynamic relations of stock returns and investor sentiment.
VECM analyses
Nonstationarity is a common feature of many financial time series but correctly detecting unit roots in finite samples is notoriously difficult as discussed in section 3. Although there is a strong theoretical prior that the sentiment indices must be stationary in the long run it is not clear whether this is also true in our less than infinite sample. We therefore proceed with an analyses that treats sentiment indices as unit-root nonstationary.
The results obtained confirm the findings of the previous section and also show that individual sentiment has a contemporaneously positive relation with stock market returns as hypothesized in section 2. Therefore, it is in line with the idea that noise traders push prices above intrinsic values. Insitutional sentiment has a contemporaneously negative relation with stock returns which is consistent with at least two recent findings in the literature: First, Evans and Lyons (2002) find evidence that private information in financial markets may forecast discount factors rather than cash-flows. This implies that a shift toward higher expected returns of institutions is accompanied by lower contemporaneous returns due to an increase in risk.
Turning back to the technical issues, if our sentiment indices are in fact I(1), the most interesting case in economic terms would be the existence of a cointegrating relationship (Engle and Granger, 1987 Table 2 .
For ease of exposition, we report normalized cointegrating equations which are expressed between the levels of stock market indices and the two sentiment indices seperately (see middle part of Table 4 In the lower part of Table 4 we finally show adjustment coefficients γ 1 , γ 2 of the error correction mechanism implied by the two cointegration vectors: which is a well known feature of stock returns over longer horizons (Poterba and Summers, 1988) . Furthermore, we find the theoretically expected adjustments in the error correction mechanism. A shift to higher institutional sentiment implies lower returns over short horizons. As discussed above, if institutions aggregate and interpret fundamentals this might well be informative for future discount factors rather than cash flows (Evans and Lyons (2002) find strong evidence for this in FX markets). Then, higher expected returns of institutions point towards an increase in risk (a higher discount factor) which implies lower prices but higher expected returns.
Further plausibility checks and some stability considerations
The results obtained by using bias-adjusted long-horizon regressions and VEC models indicate that individual sentiment is a proxy for noise trader risk and that institutional sentiment is conformable with expectations of smart traders who correctly aggregate fundamentals and form risk-based expectations. Given these results we would expect institutional investors to also take into account noise trader risk by individual investors (hypothesis 3). Furthermore, since institutional sentiment seems to forecast aggregate market returns one might wonder if individual traders take advantage of this forecasting relationship and try to infer future institutional sentiment. If individual sentiment really represents noise, they should not exploit this presumably fundamental based information contained in institutional investors'
expectations. Both arguments imply that the change in the sentiment of institutions should be affected by their expectations about the sentiment of individuals whereas individuals do not take account institutional sentiment when forming their expectations. We investigate this issue as a further plausibility check of our results obtained so far.
In order to do so, we estimate regressions of the following form:
where β(L) and γ(L) are polynomials in the lag operator and we are mainly interested in the parameter estimates of α I,m and α P,m whereas the remaining terms are The results are presented in Table 5 and show that institutional investors (left part of the table) consistently adjust their sentiment downwards (upwards) when they expect individual sentiment to be high (low) which is consistent with the noise trader risk story of Brown and Cliff (2005) and our third hypothesis. Furthermore, as can be seen from the right part of Table 5 , individual investors do not take into account expected institutional sentiment, thereby neglecting relevant information.
A possible explanation for this finding might be, that individual investors need time to learn about the forecasting power of institutional sentiment for future stock returns as this relation was not obvious right from the beginning of this investor survey. Therefore, one might expect individual investors to rely more heavily on institutional sentiment towards the end of the sample when they had the chance to learn about the information contained in institutional sentiment. Indeed, taking a second look at Figure 1 , it seems that both sentiment indices track each other more closely towards the end of the sample which might indicate a structural break.
However, redoing the above analysis 9 presented in Table 5 for only the last year of our sample does not lead to qualitatively different results. Furthermore, this positive comovement is not uncommon for the sentiment indices. As an example Figure 3 shows the time-varying correlation of the two DAX sentiment indices based upon a 9 We do not report the results here to conserve space.
simple rolling window estimation of 3 months (dark line) and one year (grey line).
As can be seen for both the short and longer frequency, the correlation is positive during several subsamples and not just towards the end of the sample period. Results for the other European and US American markets are very similar. Correlations for the NIKKEI are typically positive.
Stability analyses for the long-horizon regressions and VEC models are difficult since we need a long sample to reliably estimate these models and not just the last 50 observations or so. If we do estimate these models on the last 50 weeks anyway, we find somewhat weaker results than over the full sample. Although institutional sentiment still forecasts future excess returns, individual sentiment is no longer associated with statistically significant negative future returns and we find only one cointegration relationship in the VECM analyses. However, it is unclear whether these results really come from a structural break towards the end of the sample or just from selecting a short and unusual subsample which provides less precise estimation results. Therefore, it will be interesting to see, whether these results hold in a genuine out of sample test or if individual investors eventually learn about the information contained in institutional sentiment.
Conclusion
Evidence on the role of individuals and institutions in financial markets is mixed.
While several papers find evidence that individual sentiment proxies for noise trader risk (Brown and Cliff, 2005 , Kumar and Lee, 2004 , Bange, 2000 there is rare evidence on genuine institutional sentiment. We jointly investigate sentiment from both institutions and individuals and find that (i) individuals seem to proxy for noise trader risk in a new data set and that (ii) institutional sentiment seems to proxy for smart money which confirms our first two hypotheses.
These results show up in both long-horizon regressions where we adjust for the disturbing effects of persistent regressors and also in VECM analyses. The former show that institutions (individuals) consistently have correct (incorrect) expectations for all five markets over medium horizons. VECM models reveal that institutions forecast mean reversion of stock returns, whereas individuals forecast trend continuation and that, at least for the European markets, sentiment partly drives stock returns in a way consistent with the noise trader and smart money hypothesis.
As a final check for plausibility of the noise trader interpretation of our results, we investigate cross effects of one group's sentiment on the change of the other group's sentiment. Consistent with the previuos findings, higher (lower) expected individual sentiment decreases (increases) institutional sentiment whereas individuals do not take into account the information contained in institutional sentiment which confirms our third hypothesis.
Overall the results also provide evidence that survey data may be useful for forecasting financial and economic variables which supports the findings of Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2006).
As we argue towards the end of the last section, it will be interesting to see whether the relationships between sentiment and stock returns hold out of sample or whether individuals eventually learn about the information contained in institutional sentiment. 
A Appendix
The simulation procedure we employ is based on simulating new time series for each regressor to obtain bias adjusted confidence intervals for point estimates. Therefore we regress average excess returns on the two sentiment variables and control variables
where r e t+1 is the market excess return over the risk-free rate from week t to t + 1.
For all five markets we investigate, the control variables in Θ include log changes in the respective countries' CPI and monetary aggregate M3 (the monetary base for Japan). We further include changes in dividend yields 10 , short term (1 month) interest rates and the term spread (difference of yields for maturities of 10 years and 3 months) and the lagged market return. For the two US markets we further include the quality spread (difference of yields for bonds rated Baa and AAA) and the HML and SMB factors.
The simulation for each of the five stock market indices works as follows. We estimate a VAR(1)-Model that includes all variables in the above equation and imposes the null hypothesis that β 1 and β 2 are zero by setting the corresponding coefficients in the VAR to zero. The residuals are stored. Next, we bootstrap the residuals and recursively generate 10,000 new time series of the original length for all variables.
With these simulated time series in hand we estimate equation (2) for horizons of 1, 2, . . . , 60 weeks and save the estimated coefficients β
for each horizon k over the 10,000 simulations. Note that the same 10,000 simulated time series can be used for every horizon. Standard errors of all regression coefficients in the simulation are corrected for autocorrelation up to the k − 1th lag. This provides us with the empirical distribution of the point estimates which can in turn be used to perform bias-adjustments. 
